Closers and Controversy
If there is just one thing in baseball no one can agree on (there isn’t; baseball people argue over everything), it’s the role a team’s closer should play, and how much an organization should be willing to pay them in the process. With the discovery of sabermetrics and other advanced stats, some of which are actually becoming household names at this point, there’s perhaps no other position in baseball more heavily scrutinized.
Since the invention of the closer role, both usage and thought process have changed dramatically. When starting pitchers stopped throwing complete games with disturbing regularity (throw nine or pay a fine as they used to say in the golden days), obviously the bullpen began to take on a larger role. Relief pitcher usage has evolved in a similar fashion to starting pitcher usage; it began with a pitcher entering the game to collect as many outs as were needed to conclude play and gradually transitioned to shorter and shorter assignments. A modern day bullpen is now comprised of various specialists, many of whom may be called on solely for individual match ups or one quick inning of work at most. As such, the game’s first closers were guys that were expected to get 6-9 outs routinely, and it was not uncommon for them to throw over 100 innings a year easily. Obviously, today’s bullpen aces don’t lift that kind of load.
Most statistically inclined fans now realize that by definition, a save is not always terribly difficult to pick up. While a ninth inning that starts with your team holding onto a one-run lead and the heart of the opponent’s order due up makes you happy to bring in the bullpen ace, there are other stat defined save situations that would more aptly be classified as a mop-up assignment. A three-run cushion with the 7-8-9 spots coming up and only three outs standing in the way of victory? Seriously, do you really need to employ your fire-breathing 101 MPH throwing demon for such a yawn-inducing spot?
You’ve probably heard all the discussions and debate of using relief pitchers based on leverage, and that’s exactly the direction I’ve foolishly ushered this post in. You’ll still hear, even today, experts of varying degrees argue for using relievers consistently in certain innings to establish a sense of familiarity regardless of the game situation. I don’t want to get into it any further; I’m just acknowledging the existence of this schism. There’s a misplaced sex appeal for the closer role that seems to make it easy to love them despite the fact they don’t always do a whole lot to earn a save. Sometimes it seems like a closer’s primary job is actually to look the part more than, say, earn his salary by getting the tough outs other pitchers couldn’t. There’s no question closers have become overblown in recent years. Guys like Jonathan Papelbon, who is a fine relief pitcher by the way, fit the description perfectly as much due to style and projected aura than actual ability. Perhaps this is why the Philadelphia Phillies inked him to a questionable contract this past off-season, giving him four years and nearly $50 million to pitch 60 innings a year. That’s assuming he stays healthy, of course, and health does matter more for a closer than most; a position player who misses a few months could still get 500 plate appearances, a starter who misses a few months could still log 150 innings, but a closer who misses a few months is only going to pitch like 40 innings. Contracts like Papelbon’s are rare for closers, and they should be. It’s a dicey investment, after all.
Perhaps it’s unfair to pick on Papelbon, though. It isn’t his fault that apparently even general managers are swayed enough by the romantic appeal of the closer role to seriously overpay for his services. At least Papelbon is a quality relief pitcher in his prime and coming off a ridiculous season in which he struck out nearly nine times as many batters as he walked. Contrast his deal with the one the Miami Marlins handed out to Heath Bell and it suddenly looks brilliant. Yes, it’s easy to point out how bad Bell’s deal looks now that he’s started the season off in such a horrific fashion, but honestly, this wasn’t difficult to see coming. Bell’s K/9 rate fell an alarming amount a season ago, and thus far in the 2012 season it’s stayed right there in this unwelcome new territory. Naturally, the early returns on this contract are worse than anyone could have predicted, but as is often the case with small sample sizes, part of this woeful performance is merely bad luck, and it will improve from here. That said, Bell has always allowed too many base runners to be classified as a truly elite reliever, and it’s hard to argue that Miami made a sound decision in guaranteeing him $27 million over the next three seasons.
The bottom line is there are closers worthy of legendary status, and possibly even top dollar. But for every Mariano Rivera (as if there could ever be more than one of that) and Billy Wagner, there are literally dozens of guys that manage a few elite seasons in the role and then disappear. Closers are born (and subsequently demoted) at a whirlwind rate, and there’s really not a position in baseball more likely to yield volatile results. While there are many differing schools of thought on assigning a monetary value and a method of deployment for these intriguing bullpen arms, it should be obvious to anyone paying attention not to place too much emphasis on the closer role. Teams should avoid investing in big name established closers at all costs, and in fact should stay away from making noteworthy financial commitments to relievers in general. Elevating a guy who racks up a misleading and mostly pointless stat is a strange practice at best. No matter how a manager elects to use his closer, we’re still talking about a relief pitcher, after all.
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