Analyzing the Rays/Cubs Matt Garza Trade

Every once in a while, there are trades that belie the reputation of the GMs and organizations making them. Dayton Moore made a number of good moves at the trade deadline, while even revered execs like Theo Epstein and Billy Beane have made some head-scratching moves in recent years.

This is decidedly not one of those deals.

The Tampa Bay Rays are probably the finest-run organization in baseball, with a great major league team and fantastic minor league system on a bare-bones payroll. The Chicago Cubs are the opposite, a team with bloated salaries that can’t translate into wins.

In this trade, the Rays showed keen aptitude in reinforcing their organization as they enter a transitional phase. The Cubs, on the other hand, showed an affinity for shiny objects, and little in the way of a concrete plan.

Let’s break it down.

The Rays are a small-market team, no doubt about it. In order to stay competitive in the toughest division  in baseball, they need to always be stocking and restocking young talent, because the second their stars hit free agency, they leave.

With franchise icon Carl Crawford leaving for the rival Red Sox, first baseman Carlos Pena signing with the Cubs, and shortstop Jason Bartlett traded to San Diego, the Rays lost a full third of their starting position players. They can somewhat replace those players from within (Desmond Jennings, Reid Brignac, Dan Johnson) thanks to their depth, but they need to keep beefing up the system to provide youth and depth to stay viable in the AL East.

An easy way to do that was open up a rotation spot for prized rookie Jeremy Hellickson by trading a more established pitcher. The downgrade from Matt Garza to Hellickson may or may not be significant, but Hellickson could be a stud as early as this year, and should at least provide competency in Garza’s place. With enviable high-minors pitching (Matt Moore, Jake McGee, Alex Torres, Alex Cobb, Nick Barnese, etc.) the Rays are well-positioned to not only replace Matt Garza, but also decently patch any other rotation holes that come up.

Trading Garza for prospects has many benefits: it at least frees up one rotation spot for the bevy of quality young arms, it saves the Rays some money, and it allows them to replenish their farm system to be able to compete long-term.

In short, moving him for really anybody young and with potential makes sense for Tampa Bay.

And Chicago? They find themselves in an odd situation. The Cubs won 75 games last year, beating out only the Pirates in the six-team NL Central, and watched as the Brewers made significant upgrades. The Cardinals and Reds will join Milwaukee in a spirited three-team race for the Central in 2011.

The Cubs are a big-market team, which means they have a ton of money to throw at free agents and in the amateur draft. Ideally, a big-market team leverages that cash in both those areas to create a blend of imported stars and excellent homegrown prospects. The Yankees are a great example of this: not only did they sign CC Sabathia, Alex Rodriguez, Mark Teixeira, etc., they also have one of the game’s best farm systems and have many homegrown players in the bigs.

If you have so much money, you really shouldn’t need to use prospects as further currency. Sure, it wouldn’t be the worst idea for the Yankees to plug a hole here and there by trading away a big-time prospect, but then again, the Yankees are far closer to contending than Chicago is.

What I’m saying is that the Cubs don’t need Garza any more than the Rays do. They have a bevy of good minor league and young major league arms, they have money to spend on free agents, and they aren’t in a great position to win in the next two seasons (after which Garza is a free agent).

So the Rays did something they needed to do. The Cubs did something they did not need to do.

Making matters more ridiculous is the fact that Garza isn’t that good. He’s a fine pitcher, but the Rays’ excellent defense made him beat his FIP marks in each of the last three years. Even if we believe in his ERAs, they were still a shade under 4.00, which is hardly elite. He will be moving from the AL East to the NL Central, but he’s a flyball pitcher moving to a less-friendly park, so that will likely make up for some of that difference.

Matt Garza is a nice third starter, perhaps a decent second starter if he takes well to the NL, but he won’t make the same impact on Chicago that Zack Greinke will for Milwaukee.

Furthermore, the rotation isn’t really the big problem for the Cubs, anyway. Their rotation’s FIP last year was a collective 4.04, which was middle-of-the-pack, and better than Garza’s. Ryan Dempster, Randy Wells, Tom Gorzelanny, Carlos Zambrano, and Carlos Silva all had lower FIPs than Garza, and there are a number of young arms like Andrew Cashner and Jay Jackson who should figure into the rotation mix as well in 2011.

Gulp. Well, that’s pretty bad news for this trade, isn’t it?

The Cubs needed help at the plate (.317 wOBA in 2010) much more than they needed Garza, and that’s assuming they should look to improve immediately, which is a dubious strategy at best anyway. You have to figure the Brewers will be out of the picture in a couple of years; they just went for broke in 2011 and 2012. The Cubs looked like the sort of team that would peak right after that, in 2013-14, with Cashner, Jackson, Chris Archer, Robinson Chirinos, Starlin Castro, and others leading the way. 2011-12 isn’t likely to be the Cubs’ big chance even now, but they tore a big hole in their 2013-and-beyond chances for an ill-fated run at the present, here.

It may seem like I just spent 1000 words dancing around the details of what the hell the Cubs gave up, so to mitigate that, let’s look at the players.

Chris Archer was recently ranked the #1 prospect in the Cubs system by Baseball America, and second in the system and 58th in baseball by me. Here’s what I said about him on my top 100 prospects list:

"Archer is similar to [Rays RHP prospect and #60 ranked prospect Alex] Colome: a power fastball/curveball pitcher that lacks polish. He slots in ahead of Colome because he’s proven himself at Double-A (1.81 ERA there this year), while Colome has not, and Archer is just three months older. Long a pitcher who struggled to throw strikes, Archer got it together long enough to dominate High-A (82/26 K/BB in 72 innings) before watching his walks shoot back up to five per nine in Double-A. He has front-of-the-rotation stuff, but Archer hasn’t posted a BB/9 below 5.00 in full-season ball anytime except for that one High-A stretch, so Cubs fans can’t anoint him the future ace just yet. His control is improving, though, and it’s certainly encouraging to see Archer succeed in spite of the walks."

In trading Garza for Archer, the Rays trade one good power righty for a younger, riskier, but potentially as-good power righty, save money, and get control of the new power righty for half a decade longer than the old one. Archer’s control is balky enough that that trade alone would be iffy, but it would make more sense for the Rays to trade Garza for Archer, straight-up, than it would for the Cubs to do the trade that actually happened.

Slotting in just three slots behind Archer on my top 100 prospects was catcher Robinson Chirinos, of whom I said:

"As someone who takes age into account a lot, and perhaps excessively, in these rankings, it’s really difficult to put a 26-year-old who spent most of 2010 in Double-A in this spot. But what else could I do? Chirinos hit .314/.409/.576 in Double-A and then .345/.419/.582 in Triple-A…and he’s a catcher. He rarely strikes out, owns plus power, solid plate discipline, and a strong arm behind the plate. Heck, the guy even can help out as an extra infielder—he used to play shortstop early in his career. With essentially no flaws in his game (okay, except for going 1-for-6 on the bases this year), Chirinos could be an extremely dangerous offensive catcher, and basically forced me to rank him here despite his advanced age."

Now, relative to the consensus, putting Chirinos as the 61st best prospect in baseball is pretty optimistic for him. Still, most prospect evaluators believe he’s at worst an excellent backup catcher. The Rays have seen how quickly catchers can take downturns (see Navarro, Dioner), and while they currently boast a very good starter behind the plate in John Jaso, there’s no reason to not get help with Chirinos. Jaso himself has a long injury history and his 2010 season came somewhat out of nowhere, not to mention that the Rays aren’t comfortable with him facing lefthanded pitchers. Jaso and Chirinos could become an elite catching platoon, and if Jaso slumps, Chirinos could step in and be an excellent starter himself.

Oh, and according to most (not me), Chirinos is the fourth-best prospect in the deal, slotting behind shortstop Hak-Ju Lee and outfielder Brandon Guyer. Lee posted a .354 OBP in Low-A as a 19-year-old this past year, and boasts plus speed and defense, while Guyer hit a crazy .344/.398/.588 in Double-A this past year, hitting 39 doubles, six triples, 13 homers, and 30 steals.

That’s a lot to give up. I’m honestly somewhat torn on whether I like this package or the Brewers/Greinke package better. The Brewers gave up more certain MLBers, but I feel like there may be as much or more upside here.

The teams also swapped extra-outfielder types, with Sam Fuld (.272/.383/.394 in AAA last year) heading to Tampa for Fernando Perez (.223/.280/.299 in AAA last year). Perez is two years younger and has hit better than that in the past (.288/.361/.393 in AAA in 2008), but even that’s a wash at best. The Cubs also received a pitcher to be named later in the deal. It’d need to be one of the Rays better young arms–Nick Barnese, Alex Cobb, or Alex Torres at the least–to make this deal even remotely acceptable for Chicago.

If any move perfectly encapsulates the Cubs’ dysfunction and the Rays’ excellence, this is the one.