Diamond Deities: Extra Innings and the All Important Save Rule

Last Sunday night, the Red Sox and Rays were playing scoreless baseball. Jeff Niemann and Josh Beckett each threw eight scoreless innings, but the Red Sox were starting to rally against the Rays’ bullpen. In preparation for a lead, Red Sox manager Terry Francona had two men up in his bullpen–Daniel Bard and Jonathan Papelbon. Bard was warming in case the Red Sox did not score and Papelbon was warming in case they did, so that he could pick up a save. The Red Sox failed to score until the sixteenth inning, at which point Francona was allowed finally to use his best reliever.Why allowed? Well because the save rule clearly states that a “closer is not allowed to be used until a save situation.” (No citation needed).

All kidding aside, this managerial strategy is completely ridiculous. While lesser relievers work to keep the game tied, the team’s best reliever is saved until there is a lead or in other words, when there is technically less pressure to pitch and the numbers bear that out. Going into the bottom of the ninth (or any inning after that) tied, the road team has roughly a 35% chance of winning*. Give the road team a run and their chance of winning goes up to about 80%. So, what this is telling me is that Francona would rather use Alfredo Aceves when he has a greater likelihood of losing? It all comes down to the supposed mentality of the closer. There’s only one guy on the team that has it and anyone else who is asked to get the last three outs of the game will not be able to stand the pressure.

This is definitely not something that is unique to Francona. A lot of managers adhere to this logic. Last year, the Mets and Cardinals played a very similar game to the Red Sox and Rays, but this game went scoreless even longer. On April 17, 2010, New York and St. Louis were scoreless through the first 18 innings. Mets manager Jerry Manual had his closer Francisco Rodriguez ready just in case the Mets took the lead. He had him ready for 12 straight innings. It was estimated that Rodriguez threw over 100 pitches in the bullpen just keeping himself warmed up. The Mets eventually scored a run in the nineteenth and out came Rodriguez. Predictably, he didn’t have much left as he allowed the Cardinals to come back and tie the game. Why not just use Rodriguez in the ninth or tenth when he would be the most effective and in turn use the rest of your relievers when they would be most effective?

Jerry Manual might not be any fan’s idea of a great tactician, but perhaps the greatest offender of this strategy was none other than Joe Torre in one of the most important games of the year. In Game Four of the 2003 World Series, the Yankees had come back in the ninth inning to tie against the Florida Marlins. The game went into extras and Torre decided to use Jose Contreras for two innings and then Jeff Weaver until the game ended or until the Yankees took the lead. Weaver had come to the Yankees in 2002 as part of a big trade with the Detroit Tigers. He completely flopped as an ace starter with the Yankees presumably because he couldn’t take the pressure. Going into that appearance in Game Four, Weaver hadn’t pitched in nearly a month and was generally considered the last man out of the bullpen. Meanwhile, Mariano Rivera, the best reliever in the history of the game, was sitting in the bullpen. Predictably, the Marlins got to the shaky Weaver in the twelfth when Alex Gonzalez hit a walk-off home run down the left field line. Perhaps two innings from Rivera could have kept the game going into at least the thirteenth and given the Yankee offense another chance to pull out the game. The Marlins would win the next two games and take the World Series.

No doubt home teams do better in extra innings because they are not burdened by the “save rule.” Home managers will not hesitate to use their closer in the ninth or tenth of a tie game because it is not possible for a save to be recorded. Joe Torre had no problem with using Rivera at home in a tie game. The most notable case came just a few days before the 2003 World Series. In Game Seven of the ALCS, Rivera pitched three innings to preserve a tie before the Yankees won on an Aaron Boone homer.

Why does the save rule matter so much? Why should it’s very existence affect the outcome of a game? I have no idea and it is time for managers to wake up and realize the absurdity of this strategy.

*The win probability I used is based on a run environment of 5.0 runs per game. The numbers change slightly based on the run environment.