As we hurtle toward the start of spring training, a semi-major trade still crops up every now and then, as teams look to reshuffle their rosters for the umpteenth time to try to gain any possible competitive advantage.
The latest move saw the Cubs send lefty Tom Gorzelanny to the Nationals for outfield prospect Michael Burgess and pitching prospects A.J. Morris and Graham Hicks.
It’s odd to see the established MLB player in a Cubs/Nationals deal be the one heading east, since the Nationals have been seemingly building and rebuilding ever since moving to DC, and the Cubs, conversely, always seem to be getting ready to contend. Even now, it seems that the Cubs are the more present-minded of the two teams; they just sent away a boatload of prospects, after all, while the two most important players in the Washington organization, Bryce Harper and Stephen Strasburg, are slated to spend 2011 in the minors and on the DL, respectively.
There are a bunch of different ways to look at this deal.
First, let’s consider this strictly for the Cubs. In the past month, they’ve exchanged Gorzelanny for Garza in the rotation, which is basically a wash–Garza had a FIP exactly half a run higher last year, but he was pitching in the AL East, and he’s younger and under contract for longer. In order to make that relatively sideways exchange, Chicago had to part with decent MLB backup Sam Fuld and four decent-or-better prospects, receiving only one noteworthy prospect in return (more on the prospects in a bit).
Obviously, that’s a downgrade, and there’s no excuse for Jim Hendry to have sacrificed so much on the farm for such little gain on the 2011 team.
So, that’s one sense. But then again, it’s unfair to me to call this trade bad for Chicago simply because the Cubs’ last trade was abysmal.
Let’s look at Gorzelanny. He’s 28 years old and has an unimpressive career FIP of 4.54. He’s been all over the place in his career–he was a decent pitch-to-contact guy in 2007, fell apart in 2008, and then became a high-strikeout, high-walk pitcher in the last two years. Effectively, he’s been Clayton Richard, Dana Eveland, and Jonathan Sanchez…all in a four-year span.
Say what you want about the Garza trade, but it left the Cubs with Garza, five veteran rotation options, and some young pitchers vying for the rotation, so it made no sense to keep them all around when other areas of the team had gaping holes. With Gorzelanny bearing little resemblance to his past self from year to year, it made sense for him to go, as he was coming off a career year.
While Gorzelanny was as good, or possibly better, than Garza last year, a number of factors prevented Hendry from getting Garza-value for him:
1.) Gorzelanny spent most of his career pitching for terrible Pittsburgh teams.
2.) The memories of his 2008 drubbing haven’t quite washed away, and he even posted a 5.55 ERA (that he didn’t deserve) in 2009.
3.) There’s only one Jim Hendry, and Ned Colletti wasn’t really in the market for starting pitchers.
Compare that to Garza, who was a hotter prospect to begin with, was a central figure in the Tampa Bay turnaround, and has some captivating postseason starts and a no-hitter on his resume. To the eye test, Garza seems ready to break out into stardom, while Gorzelanny seems a risk to completely wash out. Are these characterizations fair? Probably not, but there’s no question that they played into why Garza was valued much more highly.
We can’t underestimate the above Reason 3. As I’ve stressed in the past (most notably with the Zack Greinke trade), we can’t allow ourselves to underrate prospect returns just because someone else overpaid. Just because Gorzelanny got a lower return than Garza doesn’t mean the return was bad, since by most accounts (including mine), the Garza trade was a travesty.
So what did the Cubs get? They got Michael Burgess. Burgess is the sort of guy the Cubs seem to collect, in that he’s a hitter whose raw ability seems to run ahead of his production. Despite being touted as a fantastic hitter and five-tool type, Burgess only hit .262/.351/.430 in High-A at age 21, which is a solid line, but nothing too shocking for a right fielder. He did hit .284/.391/.649 in Double-A down the stretch, but six homers in 21 games can blow a slugging percentage out of proportion, and his strikeout rate went way up at the higher level. Burgess is a solid B-grade prospect; he’s got quite a few things going his way, but there are enough questions to cast plenty of doubt on his ever being any sort of core player. A reasonable projection for him is to be a .275/.350/.475 sort of player, like the 2010 version of Torii Hunter. His tools give him the chance to be more; his contact issues and history of struggles give him the chance to be less.
And that’s really it for the prospect package. Each of the four prospects the Cubs gave up for Garza had a legitimate trait to get excited about. Chris Archer has the stuff. Hak-Ju Lee has the defense and speed. Brandon Guyer and Robinson Chirinos have the stats.
But A.J. Morris and Graham Hicks? Yawn.
Morris has already turned 24 and has yet to see Double-A. He turned in a workmanlike season in High-A last year, showing OK control and good groundball ability, but not a whole lot else. Could he be a sixth-starter, wait-in-Triple-A type? Sure. Could he maybe pitch some sixth innings out of the ‘pen someday? Perhaps. But let’s face it: a K/BB barely better than 2/1 and a near-4.00 ERA in a pitcher’s league aren’t very impressive from a guy old for his level. Scouts don’t like his offspeed stuff, and while he’s got a good sinker, it’s not good enough on its own to give him much of a career.
Hicks was young for his level (Low-A) at 20, and like Morris, he’s a former fourth-round pick, so at least he was once somewhat-highly valued on draft day. A lanky lefty, he’s got some room to fill out and add velocity, but he has yet to do anything statistically in his three pro seasons to generate much excitement whatsoever. He did make strides in 2010 over his disastrous 2009, particularly with his K/BB, but there’s still lots of work to be done. Like Burgess, Hicks is more projection than stats, which is fine, but it makes him a poor bet to join Burgess on the Cubs roster. There’s a small chance he could evolve into something, but presently, Hicks has no clear plus skills, and until the mystic “projection” becomes reality, it’s tough to call him much beyond a flier. That’s not to slam Hicks, or to slam the Cubs for trying to get him: fliers can, and sometimes do, pan out. But realistically, Burgess is the only player of the three that currently projects to play a significant role for the Cubs.
Is that worth Gorzelanny? Sure, given that the Cubs had a surplus of starters and need offensive help not only now, but in the future. While the return pales in comparison for the cost of Garza, the bottom line is that six years of a player who projects to be a league-average right fielder (plus two C/C+ prospects) is a fair return for two years of a slightly-above-average starting pitcher who is somewhat maxed out currently (how high can a lefty starter with a sub-90 mph fastball and high walk rate climb) and has had plenty of struggles in the past.
The elephant-in-the-room question of “Was it the best offer they got?” is, of course, present, particularly in light of Hendry’s own Garza overpay, but we’ll never know. Plenty of recent trades have indicated that the laughable overpays are now the exception, not the norm.
Oh yeah, there’s another side of this trade! I probably should talk about that…
Other than Livan Hernandez, no pitcher on the Nationals started 26+ games last year. The next five pitchers after Hernandez in order of games started is the illustrious quintet of John Lannan, Craig Stammen, Luis Atilano, Scott Olsen, and Jason Marquis. Olsen was the only pitcher of the five who showed much, and he’s off to Pittsburgh on an $850K contract.
Needless to say, upgrading the rotation is of paramount importance for the Nationals to stay competitive.
Should the Nationals try to compete, though? Bryce Harper’s still in the minors and Stephen Strasburg will miss most of 2011. It’s not like the 2011 rotation will be that great with Gorzelanny anyway. It seems oddly timed to trade prospects for an established player when your team is set to peak with the prospects.
There’s more at work here behind the scenes though. I live in Virginia, and the only team anyone cares about in these parts is the Washington Redskins. Other than brief Strasburg-mania, the Nats have been a joke for the last half-decade. They’re still trying to establish a fanbase, and only so much of that fanbase will heed the “be patient, wait for Bryce Harper!” pleas.
It would obviously be in the Nationals’ disinterest to blow up the farm system to appease such misguided pleas, but I’m not convinced they’ve done that here. Burgess’ stock has fallen from where it once was, and neither pitcher they traded projects to contribute much. Harper’s going to be manning right field for future Washington contenders anyway, and they just signed Jayson Werth to a megadeal to take the other long-term corner outfield spot, so Burgess was expendable in the long-term plans. Adding three wins and a credible, established pitcher to the team is a legitimate step in appeasing the more impatient side of an already thin fanbase as the Nats wait for their homegrown stars to convert a whole new legion of fans later on in the decade. They didn’t give up too much to get him, so it works.
It’s legitimately a win-win trade, even though both teams appear to be going against their traditional strategies.