Yesterday, the Nationals sent outfielder Nyjer Morgan to Milwaukee for minor league infielder Cutter Dykstra. It certainly wasn’t an earth-shattering move for either side, but Morgan and Dykstra are somewhat prototypical players (we’ll get to what specific prototypes they are in a bit). As such, they make for an interesting study on the transience of defined player values.
Let’s flash back to 2003. Michael Lewis‘ Moneyball has just hit the shelves, and statistical thought explodes. Rapidly, guys like J.P. Ricciardi and Paul DePodesta are in prominent executive positions, Bill James is working for the Red Sox, and fan interest in sabermetrics soars.
Of course, the first instinct many have in the post-Moneyball world is to continue to acquire low-cost OBP/OPS types with no defensive ability. After all, those championed in Lewis’ book tend to be guys like Matt Stairs, Scott Hatteberg, and Jeremy Giambi, and the idea of “tools” and drafting high school players is looked on as misguided.
Of course, that didn’t last too long. Oakland’s famed Moneyball draft largely fizzled, and since other teams were now on to walks/power-style hitters, they were no longer a niche to exploit. Billy Beane’s current Athletics are still a solid team, but they’re built with pitching (much of it originally out of high school) and speed/defense–the exact opposite of those glorified 2000-03 A’s.
When Moneyball first came out back in ’03, Nyjer Morgan was entering his first season of pro ball after being drafted in the 33rd round of the 2002 draft by the Pirates. As he rose through the Pirates system, Morgan wasn’t the sort of player statistical analysts of the immediate post-Moneyball era would have the slightest interest in. He was a moderately patient slap hitter who bunted (gasp!) and stole bases (double gasp!) and had no power to speak of.
On the other hand, had Cutter Dykstra been drafted in 2003, he may have piqued the interest of Moneyball devotees. In 238 career games, he has 120 walks, and he’s coming off a .312/.416/.411 season in Low-A. Sure, there’s not too much power there, but the Midwest League is a tough place to hit, and power is often the last tool to develop. Sure, he doesn’t have a defensive position, but then again, those early-2000’s A’s didn’t have too many defensive-oriented players.
Of course, a) I’m way oversimplifying and b) the Moneyball thing was just a trend. Much of the book’s values persist in today’s sabermetric community, but a lot of its strategic recommendations are obsolete due to a) new data/research and b) the shift that the book itself caused.
So Nyjer Morgan is a prototypical slap-hitting speed ‘n’ defense center fielder, and Cutter Dykstra is a walks-and-contact guy with questionable defense and power. In 2004, Dykstra would’ve been valued far more highly than Morgan (at least by the “cutting edge”). However, in the last few years, many small-market teams (A’s, Mariners, Rays, Padres, etc.) shifted their resources to an old-school “pitching and defense” approach. Those same A’s that used to have outfields with Matt Stairs, Jeremy Giambi, Terrence Long, Emil Brown, and Adam Piatt used Rajai Davis, Coco Crisp, and Ryan Sweeney as their primary outfield trio last year, and the Padres nearly won the NL West with Will Venable as their second-best hitter.
Nyjer Morgan, as a result of all of this shift to defense, saw a big spike in his value. In 2009, sabermetric analysts fell in love with his 27.6 UZR, which combined with a solid .307/.369/.388 batting line to make him basically a five-win player–WAR rated him as the third-best center fielder, eleventh-best outfielder, and 29th-best position player in baseball in 2009. That WAR total bested that of such notables as Ryan Howard, Joey Votto, Justin Upton, Alex Rodriguez, Brian McCann, Justin Morneau, and David Wright.
So there was Nyjer Morgan–sort of the “new sabermetric hero” in a way, or even possibly an “anti-Moneyball” player. And Cutter Dykstra, with little power or defensive ability, wasn’t thought of as much of a prospect. Hell, he still isn’t–Baseball America left him off the Brewers’ top 30 prospect list this year, and it’s not like there really are 30 good prospect in that system.
But this stuff cycles. Nyjer Morgan crashed and burned in 2010, putting up a meek .253/.319/.314 line with merely above-average defense, once again pegging him as the fifth outfielder type that the first wave of post-Moneyball sabermetrics thought he was all along. Any player can fail to live up to the expectations of his backers, whether that player is a squat 230-pound catcher or a speedy 165-pound center fielder (And let’s not start on pitchers!).
It may seem that I’ve just spent 760 words saying absolutely nothing, and maybe that is what I’ve done. But my point in all of this is that both Nyjer Morgan and Cutter Dykstra are obviously flawed players. Morgan needs BABIP luck to be any sort of useful offensive player, and Dykstra lacks a defensive home that can withstand his current lack of pop. You can say that the 21-year-old Dykstra has time to fix his issues while the 30-year-old Morgan is what he is, and while that’s true, Dykstra also hasn’t even hit in the Florida State League yet, while Morgan’s got years of MLB competence under his belt.
Morgan’s likely to end up sharing time in Milwaukee’s middle pasture with Carlos Gomez, a similarly anti-Moneyball player who never walks but runs like the wind. A platoon between the two could at least somewhat mask the offensive deficiencies of both, and acquiring Morgan for a low-level prospect like Dykstra is a solid pickup for a Milwaukee team making a serious World Series push. The Brewers are going to probably struggle in 2014 with or without Dykstra, so they might as well leverage him into more talent now. The upgrade from say, 90 to 91 wins now is more significant than going from 65 to 66 or 67 a few years down the line.
The Nationals had little use for Morgan, so Dykstra’s a nice pickup. Guys who put up .416 OBPs when they’re young for their level are pretty rare, and although Dykstra’s skillset isn’t particularly diverse, he could grow into 10-15 homer power, which would give him a solid all-around offensive package. What he really needs is a defensive home, which is almost certain to be in the outfield since he’s badly struggled at both second and third base and doesn’t have the bat for first. He’s got some speed, so perhaps he could stick in center field, where he’d be an intriguing prospect. He’s the sort of guy who could well be en vogue in a few years if the current defense-first strategy fades out as the market inefficiencies slide back toward offense-oriented guys.
First, of course, Dykstra will have to hit, and his walk rate is likely to go down at upper levels unless he grows into some pop. There’s enough talent there for him to be an interesting pickup.
Both of these players had or can have their moments in the sun, based on both the luck inherent in the game or the swaying trends in roster construction. As such, they’re pretty fair to trade for each other, particularly when they fit the goals of the team they’re going to more than those of the one they came from. This looks like a good move for both sides.