Baseball Hall of Fame: Five Reasons Trevor Hoffman Is NOT a Hall of Famer

The Save Statistic Is Ridiculous

I admit right up front that I do not like the save as a statistic. I think the intentions were good. Sportswriter Jerome Holtzman created the statistic in 1969 because he didn’t think wins and losses were fitting statistics for relievers. He was right about that. No one should judge a reliever by his win-loss record. There are too many variables involved for a relief pitcher to be judged by wins and losses.

Holtzman created the save statistic in 1969, but it was refined over the next few years until we arrived at our current definition of a save, which has been in use since 1975. This is the rule:

A relief pitcher is awarded a save when he meets all three of the following conditions:

• He is the finishing pitcher in a game won by his club; and
• He is not the winning pitcher; and
• He qualifies under one of the following conditions:

~ He enters the game with a lead of no more than three runs and pitches for at least one inning; or
~ He enters the game, regardless of the score, with the potential tying run either on base, at bat, or on deck; or
~ He pitches at least three innings.

For many years, the save was a statistic like any other. The game would be played, one team would win, another would lose, and the results were tallied. Somewhere along the line this changed. Managers began managing based on the statistic, rather than just let the statistic record what happened. Managers would bring in their closers based on when the save opportunity arose.

You see this often these days. Here’s an example. The home team starts the top of the ninth inning with a four-run lead. The win expectancy, based on games from 1957 to 2015, is 99.05 percent (with a three-run lead, the win expectancy would be 97.95 percent). Since it’s not a save situation yet, the closer remains in the bullpen and the manager brings in one of his middle relief guys. If that middle reliever allows a couple of base runners, even if he gets two outs along the way, suddenly you have a save situation because the tying run is on deck. It’s time for the closer.

The thing is, with that four-run lead and two outs and runners on first and second, the win expectancy is 99.42 percent. It’s actually higher than when the inning started. But because there’s now a save opportunity, in comes the closer. The manager is using his bullpen based on a statistic.

When you consider the win expectancy for teams that have a three run lead at the start of the ninth inning, it seems ridiculous that you would “save” your best pitcher for that situation just so he can earn another tally in his personal saves column. Consider this chart for win expectancy.

Win Exp.—Situation

87%–Top of 9^th, home team leads by 1

94%–Top of 9^th, home team leads by 2

98%–Top of 9^th, home team leads by 3

82%–Bottom of 9^th, away team leads by 1

92%–Bottom of 9^th, away team leads by 2

97%–Bottom of 9^th, away team leads by 3

With a three run lead at the beginning of the ninth inning, top or bottom, the team with the lead is going to win 97-98 percent of the time. Yet managers still go to their closer in these situations and often do so after leaving their closer on the bench when a more important moment occurred earlier in the game.