Hall of Fame: What now for Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens?

The Hall of Fame prospects of two of the game’s greats are more problematic given the results of the 2019 election

Tuesday’s Hall of Fame results are prompting a re-evaluation of whether Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens will ever be voted into the Hall of Fame.

Clemens received 253 votes while Bonds got 251 among the 425 ballots cast. As has been the case for several years, support for the two moved virtually in lockstep. Only a literal handful of voters chose one but not the other.

Their total represented 59.1 percent for Bonds, 59.5 percent for Clemens. Both percentages are up two to three points from their 2018 totals, when Bonds was named on 56.4 percent of ballots and Clemens on 57.3 percent.

Both will be on the ballot for three more elections, unless, obviously, they are voted in.

In the wake of Tuesday’s announcement, several lines of logic surfaced in an attempt to predict their chances. The most optimistic to both men was the contention that Tuesday’s result, electing four men, had the side effect of opening space on future ballots for voters who have not previously named Bonds and/or Clemens to do so.

Mariano Rivera, Edgar Martinez, Roy Halladay and Mike Mussina all were elected, Martinez and Mussina following several years of being overlooked.

The consensus is that the 2020 and 2021 ballots are weak, with only Derek Jeter in 2020 an obvious choice.

The problem with that line of logic is its underlying assumption that those not voting for Bonds or Clemens failed to do so because they believed there were 10 more qualified candidates. It’s doubtful there are 10 people in the world who would buy that premise.

Rather, the obvious reason for voters not to support Bonds and Clemens is the steroid issue, an aspect of their candidacies that is hard-wired into the voters’ views whether there are zero, 10 or a thousand other plausible candidates.

A glance at the publicly available voting records makes that pretty plain.

As of the time of the announcement of the results, 61 voters who had not voted for Bonds and Clemens in either 2017 or 2018 had made their 2019 ballots public. Of those 61, 60 — 98.3 percent — again chose not to vote for either one. We already know that approximately 175 voters chose not to vote for either candidate this year. Since a number annually make their ballots public only following the election, it will be interesting to see whether the percentage of consistent Bonds/Clemens “nos” decreases to any significant extent.

That number is vital to the argument. Since the roster of eligible Hall voters was trimmed for the 2016 election, between 425 and 440 voters have cast ballots. The 2019 vote total of 425 represented a low for that period. If one assumes 440 votes next year, that gives any bloc of 111 an absolute veto over any player’s candidacy.

Because we don’t yet have maximum disclosure on the 2019 results, the 2018 election is, for the moment anyway, our best barometer. In that election, 202 voters failed to vote for Bonds and 198 failed to vote for Clemens, of whom 115 made their ballots public. Eighty-five of those 115 also failed to vote for either Bonds or Clemens in 2017.

Assuming those 85 confirmed Bonds/Clemens foes continued to oppose them in 2019 – and further assuming they continue to do so in future elections– it would only be necessary for 30 of the approximately 85 anonymous anti-Bonds/Clemens voters to remain steadfast and the players’ candidacies would be doomed.

That scenario requires only three things of the anti-Bonds/Clemens voters: 1. They must remain alive; 2. They must continue to vote; 3. They must not change their minds.

The only other positive scenario for Bonds/Clemens backers lies with new voters, who by most tracking estimates are giving the two upwards of 90 percent support. Still, the hill for those supporting that theory is a steep one, resting on a succession of assumptions, none of them certain.

We can test the prospect that raw attrition could work decisively in favor of Bonds and/or Clemens by making the following three assumptions:

Suppose five percent of the electorate turns over annually.
Then suppose literally every new voter is a pro-Bonds/Clemens voter replacing an anti-Bonds/Clemens backer.
Finally, suppose the raw number of voters remains what it was in 2019, 425.

There is nothing magical or even particularly likely about any of those assumptions actually happening, but in the event they all do here is the result.

In 2020, Bonds draws 272 votes and Clemens draws 274, representing 64 and 64.5 percent respectively.
In 2021, Bonds draws 293 votes and Clemens 295, representing 68.9 and 69.4 percent respectively.
In 2022, their final year of eligibility, Bonds draws 314 votes of 315 required for election. Clemens draws 316. Clemens makes it by one vote, and Bonds misses by one vote.

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The problem with that scenario is its absolute nature. It requires a significant and constant turnover, every particle of that turnover favoring Bonds and Clemens. Even then it doesn’t get Bonds to the finish line. And if as few as two new voters don’t endorse Clemens, his candidacy fails as well.

Compare the percentage gains that are required under that scenario, about 5 percent annually, with their two to three percent gains this year, then consider the consistent stridency of the opposition bloc, and their problem becomes clear.

There is one other alternative, an outcome that backers of Bonds and Clemens refer to as the ‘scare’ scenario. It’s premised on the notion that the cohort of anti-Bonds/Clemens sentiment don’t really want to deny their guys the Hall, they merely want to extract a pound of emotional flesh before voting them in.

That theory presumes that the anti Bonds/Clemens bloc will continue to oppose their Hall of Fame candidacy until the 10th and final go-around in 2022, then break with their previous voting patterns and elect them. Plausible? Well, it would require about 65 current Bonds/Clemens “nos” to undergo such a conspiratorial change of heart.