Dark side of analytics facing 2020 Phillies

If the Phillies have a numerical flaw for a winning formula, can they discover the missing ingredients in 2019’s ashes, or will general manager Matt Klentak realize some old-school baseball still has a place in the Show?

Three-sided coin:   

In ’19, the Philadelphia Phillies faithful welcomed back Charlie Manuel as an interim hitting coach to boost the offense. And he provided an improvement despite a slumping cleanup man. But while many fans had given up by then, others were optimistic their dugout nemeses would not escape a firing for failures from day one.

IN OTHER WORDS: “A pessimist sees only the dark side of the clouds and mopes; a philosopher sees both sides and shrugs; an optimist doesn’t see the clouds at all – he’s walking on them.” – Leonard Louis Levinson

Regarding the playoffs, many top franchises rely heavily –not exclusively– on analytics, and recent World Series opponents know how to incorporate stats and bats for a winning combination. However, the Fightins were not in the vanguard as those clubs learned from their defeat-absorbing mistakes. Surprised?

Armed with heat maps, spray charts, launch angles, exit velocities, and other numerical mountains, dismissed coach John Mallee left behind more questions than answers. So, Manuel returned on a temporary basis to salvage an iceberg-crashed offense.

Relying mostly on statistics will only point a pitching coach in the right direction, but the rest of the destination is not having the numbers do your job. Therefore, the map only shows the route, but negotiating the detours is done between the ears.

An organization usually terminates the skipper, and his replacement hires his own staff. Ergo, the front office wasn’t in complete agreement on Gabe Kapler’s fate because John Middleton, the managing partner, had his doubts.

According to Manuel when he was at the helm, baseball is 40 percent luck. So, pennant-winning skippers must weigh each opportunity with old-fashioned baseball remedies and situational hitting if it produces the desired outcome. But walks and three-run homers alone are not the best strategy for victory.

While traditional baseball fans dislike analytics and any management personnel who espouse it, it is 90 percent successful. Every pitch and every defensive alignment for each batter is on the defenders’ cards, but pointing out the unsuccessful 10 percent more often than the feasible majority creates the wrong impression.

Coaching by the numbers:       

Blaming the Phillies hitting coach is no more the complete answer than pointing fingers at Kapler because each deserve their share of it. So does the player. Yes, the star relies on the coach to notice slight differences in his mechanics, and the manager makes in-game calls partly based on the coach’s input.

Atop the list of questions, Rhys Hoskins‘ uppercut swing is the launch-angle method to bashing more round-trippers. His problem, therefore, is mechanical, but even a new voice couldn’t fix his approach. However, the second-half runs scored before Manuel were 4.1 per game and 5 per contest under Manuel.

In 2018, Odubel Herrera frequently took one or two pitches per at-bat without making an effort because the analytical coach was stressing pitches per AB. Well, with 2-3 more offerings Herrera had four pitches on average. Manuel’s advice, though, was to swing at good pitches even if it’s the first one.

As for Roman Quinn, he was off to a rare dismal start. And his ineffectiveness continued through Aug. 12: the fired hitting coach’s last ballgame. Then, he immediately smacked six hits in 13 at-bats in the four contests from Aug. 13 to his season-ending injury.

Three-sided coin: The coach, the skipper and the player are to blame: all three. To illustrate, rookie Adam Haseley didn’t change his plate approach of hitting down on the ball. So, batting a certain way wasn’t mandatory; therefore, the player himself deserves his fair share.

Mound visits: 

For the Phillies, the first offseason firing was pitching coach Chris Young who had replaced Rick Kranitz. Apparently, the analytical-heavy Young was drawing interest from several teams, so the red pinstripes decided on Young over Kranitz, who is now with the Atlanta Braves. Yeah, a mistake!

Between a strong 14 starts and a solid finish of eight games, Zach Eflin had five clunkers. But the hurler was throwing some high fastballs during those contests, which Young had also added to Vince Velasquez‘s and Nick Pivetta‘s arsenals. Unfortunately, this one-size-fits-all method isn’t logical for a sinker baller.

Eflin’s campaign:

• Good: 14 Gms., 86 Inn., 6-7 and a 2.83 ERA.
• Bad: 6 Gms., 26 2/3 Inn., 1-4 and a 10.46 ERA.
• Pen: 5 Gms., 5 2/3 Inn., 0-0 and a 1.59 ERA.
• Good: 8 Gms., 45 Inn., 3-2 and a 3.20 ERA.
• Good total: 22 Gms., 131 Inn., 9-9 and a 2.95 ERA.

With Velasquez, the high gas was effective. But Kapler had a quick hook for Velasquez and the two rotation southpaws in the final weeks, plus the abbreviated playoff-like outings by Velasquez and the others negate a determination of their performances. Basically, Kapler removed them in 12 of 21 starts with less than five innings.

Concerning Pivetta, the high heater helped but wasn’t enough for an every-fifth-day role. However, the flamethrower has a decent shot for a bullpen spot depending solely on his effectiveness. But he must earn a place in March if he isn’t part of a trade package.

With Young’s coaching in the rearview mirror, his instructions led to a decline in the rotation’s numbers and questionable info Kapler relied on. But the manager and the moundsmen don’t deserve exoneration either because Young, Kapler and the starters all share the blame.

The Numerical Bible:

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This review is not a sabermetrics article, which means no heavy statistical analysis. But because some readers rely on stats, this is only a reference: no reason to articulate the importance of these numbers.

Exception:

The preferred stat to measure offensive strength is wRC+ (weighted runs created plus), which adjusts for park and league. Using 100 as average, each number above or below is the percentage difference: For instance, 125 is 25 percent above average.

Phillies offensive ratings:     

• Harper: 125 (2019), 134 (2018) and 155 (2017).
• Hoskins: 113 (2019), 128 (2018) and 158 (2017).
• McCutchen: 120 (2019), 121 (2018) and 122 (2017).
• Realmuto: 108 (2019), 126 (2018) and 107 (2017).
• Kingery: 101 (2019) and 96 (2018).
• Segura: 92 (2019), 110 (2018) and 111 (2017).
• Hernandez: 92 (2019), 99 (2018) and 111 (2017).
• Miller: 126 (2019), 97 (2018) and 84 (2017).
• Haseley: 88 (2019).
• Franco: 70 (2019), 105 (2018) and 76 (2017).
• Herrera: 64 (2019), 96 (2018) and 100 (2017).        

Comparison offensive ratings:      

• Trout: 180 (2019), 190 (2018) and 180 (2017).
• Freeman: 138 (2019), 137 (2018) and 150 (2017).
• Machado: 108 (2019), 140 (2018) and 102 (2017).

If you have any questions or opinions regarding Philadelphia Phillies players, please open the comments section.