MLB: Rating the front offices of the AL Central
Chicago White Sox GM Rick Hahn stands head and shoulders above his division rivals, and was one of the best in MLB this year.
Rick Hahn has been promising Chicago White Sox fans a Great Come-And-Get-It basically since he took over in 2013. This summer, Hahn and the Sox finally delivered.
Chicago played 35-25 ball, the team’s first season above .500 since Hahn, a top aide to Kenny Williams, was promoted to take over for his old boss. True, the Sox only finished third in the AL Central, but in this expanded playoff scenario that was good enough to reach the MLB playoffs.
The Sox may have dropped out in the first round of those playoffs, but that was not Hahn’s fault. Of the five AL Central front offices, his was the most productive, improving White Sox fortunes by 4.2 games.
Our front office/general manager ratings are based on the collective short-term impact, as measured by Wins Above Average, of every personnel move made by every front office since the conclusion of play in 2019. A positive number represents a front office success. In a few cases, those marked by an asterisk, the front office really succeeded; it generated more positive impact than the margin by which the team qualified for post-season play.
If a rating is negative, that means the team’s front office reduced the club’s talent base during 2020. And woe betides a general manager who gets an asterisk for negative performance; that means the team’s execs dealt, promoted or signed their way out of the playoffs. Those rare instances are marked by an X.
As a general proposition, MLB front offices influence their team’s performance in five ways:
- By the players they acquire in trades, purchase or waiver claims with other teams.
- By the players they lose in those deals.
- By the free agents they sign.
- By the players they release or lose to free agency.
- By the rookies they promote.
Findings for the AL East and NL East have already been reported. This analysis of the AL Central front offices is not based on final standing, but rather on the extent of the positive or negative contribution of the general manager to the team profile.
Chicago White Sox
Ken Williams, executive vice president; Rick Hahn, senior vice president and general manager
+4.2 games
As the young cast he had assembled over several seasons finally matured to contender status, Hahn made most of the correct short-term moves to supplement that growing talent base. The result was the most effective MLB front office in the American League in 2020.
Chicago’s general manager made 36 personnel moves impacting the 2020 Sox, 15 of them involving the signing of free agents or extensions to players already on the roster. The total impact of those free agent signings alone was +2.7 games, the best performance on the free agent market by any general manager in MLB this season.
Three of those moves turned in to major contributions:
He extended first baseman Jose Abreu for three seasons at $50 million. Abreu produced an MVP-calibre season with a .317 average, 19 home runs and 60 RBIs.
He signed Dallas Keuchel to a three-year, $55.5 million deal. Keuchel was 6-2 with a 1.99 ERA.
He signed minor leaguer Luis Robert to a six-year, $50 million deal – essentially wrapping up his arbitration years. Robert tailed off in September, but still generated a +1.1 Wins Above Average. The combined WAA of Robert, Keuchel and Abreu? It was +4.8.
Hahn made a few mistakes, but they were survivable. His biggest error may have been investing $12 million on DH Edwin Encarnacion, who managed only a .157 batting average. But even that just translated to a -0.9 WAA.
Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the White Sox front office since 2016:
2016: – 6.8
2017: -20.6x
2018: – 8.5
2019: – 6.5
2020: + 4.2
X: This was a greater loss than the margin by which the White Sox failed to qualify for post-season play.
Minnesota Twins
Derek Falvey, president of baseball operations; Thad Levine, senior VP and general manager
+2.3 games
Falvey and Levine have functioned as a tandem in the Twins front office since Falvey was hired away from Cleveland and installed Levine to head the operations office prior to the 2017 season.
They made 35 roster adjustments since the end of the 2019 season, netting those 2.3 games of improvement in the process. For the most part, Falvey and Levine worked at the margins to improve a team that was pretty well set entering the season.
Their one big move was supposed to be the signing of slugging third baseman Josh Donaldson to a four-year, $92 million deal. But Donaldson came up small, batting just .222 with only six home runs. That translated to a +0.2 WAA, far less than what Donaldson had been expected to deliver.
Instead, Falvey and Levine hit on the acquisition of pitcher Kenta Maeda in a trade with the Dodgers. Maeda was 6-1 with a 2.70 ERA in his half dozen starts, producing a 1.0 WAA.
Discounting the Donaldson signing, Falvey and Levine kept their mistakes modest. The largest was probably their decision to re-sign Miguel Sano for three years at $30 million. That may work out over time, but Sano hit just .204 and delivered a -0.9 WAA. It was the team’s worst.
Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Twins front office since Falvey and Levine took over:
2017: – 5.1
2018: – 5.2
2019: +11.5*
2020: + 2.3
*This was a greater improvement than the margin by which the Twins qualified for post-season play.
Kansas City Royals
Dayton Moore, senior vice president and general manager
-0.2 games
Moore survived his first year under his second boss in 2020. John Sherman took over the team from David Glass last fall shortly before Glass’s death. That’s often a shaky scenario for the GM, and Moore’s contract expired at the end of the 2020 season. He was promised an extension at the time, but if Sherman has come through on that the news has been kept very low-key.
Still, there have been no intimations in Kansas City that Sherman may be contemplating a change, and until that happens – if it even does – Moore continues as the guy in charge.
What he has not been able to do is re-create the core of a championship team that was dispatched for financial reasons following the team’s 2015 World Series win. The Royals basically stood still in 2020.
Moore made 31 personnel adjustments to the Royals’ roster since the conclusion of the 2019 season, a dozen of which involved the incorporation of rookies into a developing cast. Over time there may be ability; aggressive young arms such as Brady Singer and Josh Staumont showed serious potential.
But none of those dozen rookies produced a WAA in excess of Singer’s +0.6, so for now, the long-term impact of that rookie crop exists largely in the hopes and aspirations of Royals fans.
For the most part, Moore was cautious in his handling of a developing roster. He took on only one veteran whose MLB rating went negative to any significant extent – free agent pitcher Matt Harvey, 0-3, 11.57 in seven appearances – and Harvey came cheap.
Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Royals’ front office since 2016:
2016: -10.6
2017: – 6.7x
2018: -10.7
2019: – 9.6
2020: – 0.2
X: This was a greater loss than the margin by which the Royals failed to qualify for post-season play.
Cleveland Indians
Chris Antonetti, president of baseball operations; Mike Chernoff, general manager
-2.5 games
Antonetti and Chernoff got a lot of ink for the MLB deadline decision to ship ace pitcher Mike Clevinger to San Diego in a trade that ended up involving five major leaguers.
Clubhouse chemistry may have forced the deal, and since the Indians did play in the post-season Indians fans were probably willing to overlook the component parts of that performance. Clevinger and Greg Allen, the other player shipped to the Padres, added a half game of value to their new team. Meanwhile, Josh Naylor, Cal Quantrill, and Austin Hedges, the three new Indians, cost Cleveland three-tenths of a game in WAA.
Those five players constituted nearly one-fifth of the modest 26 player moves affecting the 2020 MLB roster that were made by Chernoff and Antonetti since the end of 2019. The team’s most significant acquisition turned out to be Cesar Hernandez, signed as a free agent. Holding down second base, Hernandez produced a +0.9 WAA.
If you want to criticize Antonetti and Chernoff, take a look at the players they dispatched to other major league teams. There were 10 of them, seven of whom produced positive value for their new teams. But to a large extent you’d be picking at nits: the most consequential loss was the release of fill-in reliever A.J. Cole. He signed with Toronto for similar duties and enjoyed a largely unremarkable 3-0, 3.09 season, worth +0.6 WAA.
Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Indians’ front office since Chernoff became GM in 2016:
2016: +0.4
2017: +6.0
2018: +2.3
2019: +1.0
2020: – 2.5
Detroit Tigers
Al Avila, executive vice president of baseball operations and general manager
-5.3 games
Avila is one of those GMs who makes you wonder how they’re still employed.
His personnel moves hurt the Tigers by 5.3 games in 2020. If that sounds bad – and it was MLB’s worst — understand this: By Avila’s standards, it’s actually pretty good. His average short-term damage to the Detroit roster since 2017 is -8.75 games.
Avila signed multi-year extension for an indefinite period back in July of 2019, so how much leash he has from team owner Chris Illitch is not clear.
The best thing Avila did was to not do very much. He made a modest 22 personnel moves affecting the 2020 roster this past season. Unfortunately, only three of those 22 generated a positive short-term value to the Tigers, the most consequential being the promotion of rookie relief pitcher Bryan Garcia. His 1.66 ERA in 26 appearances worked out to a +0.7 WAA.
Some of Avila’s moves may work out over time, even if they did not justify themselves in 2020. Pitching phenom Casey Mize was promoted in August to much fanfare. His seven starts resulted in an 0-3 record and 6.99 ERA. Some day the legions of Mize fans may look back on that and his -0.7 WAA as a humorous, meaningless footnote to an asterisk.
dark. Next. Rating the AL East front offices
Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Tigers’ front office since 2016:
2016: + 4.1
2017: – 7.1
2018: – 6.5
2919: -16.1
2020: – 5.3