MLB: Rating the front offices of the NL Central

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS - OCTOBER 28: Theo Epstein, president of baseball operations of the Chicago Cubs at a press conference introducing David Ross as the new manager of the Chicago Cubs at Wrigley Field on October 28, 2019 in Chicago, Illinois. (Photo by David Banks/Getty Images)
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS - OCTOBER 28: Theo Epstein, president of baseball operations of the Chicago Cubs at a press conference introducing David Ross as the new manager of the Chicago Cubs at Wrigley Field on October 28, 2019 in Chicago, Illinois. (Photo by David Banks/Getty Images)
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(Photo by Dilip Vishwanat/Getty Images)
(Photo by Dilip Vishwanat/Getty Images) /

NL Central front offices had some of the worst seasons in all of MLB in 2020

As their teams demonstrated in going 1-8 during the post-season, NL Central front offices collectively compiled the worst performance of any division during 2020.

Four of the five front offices hurt their teams – by margins of at least 3.9 games – in their personnel decisions. Only Chicago’s tandem of Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer improved their team’s talent base, and then only marginally.

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Strikingly, the division’s other four front offices ranked 12th through 15th in the National League in their impacts on their teams. For MLB as a whole, they occupied four of the bottom six positions.

Our MLB front office ratings are based on the collective short-term impact, as measured by Wins Above Average, of every personnel move made by every front office since the conclusion of play in 2019. A positive number represents a front office’s success. In a few cases, those marked by an asterisk, the front office really succeeded; it generated a more positive impact than the margin by which the team qualified for post-season play.

If a rating is negative, that means the team’s front office reduced the club’s talent base during 2020. And woe betides a front office that gets an asterisk for negative performance; that means the team’s execs dealt, promoted or signed their way out of the playoffs. Those rare instances are marked by an X.

As a general proposition, front offices influence their team’s performance in five ways:

  • By the players they acquire in trades, purchase or waiver claims with other teams.
  • By the players they lose in those deals.
  • By the free agents they sign.
  • By the players they release or lose to free agency.
  • By the rookies they promote.

Findings for the AL East, NL East, and AL Central have already been reported. This analysis of the NL Central front offices is not based on final standing, but rather on the extent of the front office’s positive or negative contribution to the team profile.

(Photo by David Banks/Getty Images)
(Photo by David Banks/Getty Images) /

Chicago Cubs

Theo Epstein, president of baseball ops; Jed Hoyer, GM: +1.5

The Epstein-Hoyer team made 39 personnel moves affecting the Cubs short-term abilities since the conclusion of the 2019 season. Virtually all of them, however, had a marginal impact.

In fact, you could attribute nearly 100 percent of Chicago’s statistical improvement this year to a single, very simple decision. Back in March of 2019, they extended Kyle Hendricks, the team’s most reliable starter, for four seasons at $55.5 million starting in 2020.

Hendricks responded as he always does, with a 2.88 ERA in a dozen starts and a +1.2 Wins Above Average.

Having accomplished that, Epstein-Hoyer shifted into neutral and hoped for the best. Of those 39 moves, 17 produced negative impact, none of them more impactful than the departure of free agent Brandon Kintzler. He went to Miami and produced +0.8 WAA for the Marlins. Ironically, it was Kintzler on the mound to close out the Marlins’ wild card series victory over the Cubs last week.

Epstein-Hoyer acquired six players prior to or during the season in trades with other teams, and they went zero-for-six. Their interchange with DH Jose Martinez illustrates the problems. Obtained from Tampa in late August, Martinez went hitless in 21 official at-bats, hanging a -0.7 WAA on his bosses’ record.

Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Cubs front office since 2016:

  • 2016:     +11.9
  • 2017:     +  9.0*
  • 2018:     +  2.0
  • 2019:     –   1.2
  • 2020:     +  1.5

*This was a greater improvement than the margin by which the Cubs qualified for post-season play.

(Photo by Dilip Vishwanat/Getty Images)
(Photo by Dilip Vishwanat/Getty Images) /

St. Louis Cardinals

John Mozeliak, president of baseball ops; Mike Girsch, GM: -3.9

The Cardinal front office is legendary for its efficiency, but 2020 threw obstacles in the Cardinals’ way that even Mozeliak-Girsch couldn’t overcome.

Forced in part by the team’s two-week run-in with COVID-19, the Cardinals’ personnel changes involved 34 players who affected the fortunes of the 2020 club. Several were called up or brought down three or four times. But only seven of those players generated positive value for the Cardinals; 21 turned negative.

The Cards’ fate was foreshadowed when they extended pitcher Miles Mikolas for four years at $68 million back in February of 2019. That deal began in 2020, but by then Mikolas had gone under the knife, a surgery that took him out of the picture for the full season.

That, COVID and unrelated events forced Mozeliak-Girsch to lean more heavily on their farm system. The Cardinals employed a remarkable 18 rookies in 2020, only one of whom generated positive value to the team…and that positive value was a fractional +0.1.

The sum total of the rookies’ impact on St. Louis’ standing was -4.5 WAA.

Statistically, the one saving grace was St. Louis’ signing of first baseman Paul Goldschmidt to a five-year extension, another move dating back to March of 2019 but whose impact didn’t begin until 2020. Goldschmidt returned to his Arizona form, batting .304 with a 142 OPS+. That translated to +1.2 WAA.

Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Cardinals front office since the Girsch-Mozeliak tandem was put in place prior to the 2018 season:

  • 2018:     – 2.4X
  • 2019:     +4.5
  • 2020:     -3.9

XThis was a greater negative impact than the margin by which the Cardinals failed to qualify for post-season play.

(Dylan Buell/Getty Images)
(Dylan Buell/Getty Images) /

Milwaukee Brewers

David Stearns, president of baseball operations: -4.2

Stearns gave it the old college try. Coming off consecutive playoff seasons – both of which Stearns’ moves had a substantial hand in creating – he shuffled 41 players who impacted the 2020 Brewers’ fortunes.

This time, however, Stearns’ luck wore out. Twenty-four of those moves resulted in damage to the Brewers’ abilities. His team struggled home under .500 and in fourth place in the NL Central and only made the playoffs thanks to the expanded system in place in 2020.

If Stearns could live one day over, it would probably be Nov. 27, 2019. That’s when he worked a trade in which Padres general manager A.J. Preller fleeced him big-time. Stearns sent outfielder Trent Grisham and pitcher Zach Davies to the Padres for pitcher Eric Lauer and infielder Luis Urias.

Davies and Grisham combined to generate 2.7 WAA toward the Padres’ post-season run. Lauer (0-2, 13.09) and Urias (.239 in 120 plate appearances) combined for a -1.1 WAA in Milwaukee. In that single trade, Milwaukee’s fortunes sank by nearly four games.

The offset was the development of pitcher Corbin Burnes. In his first season as a full-time starter, Burnes became the team ace, going 4-1 with a 2.11 ERA in nine starts. That was worth 1.7 WAA to Milwaukee.

Unfortunately, Burnes was the only asset coming to fruition for Stearns in 2020. It was such a snakebit year that even the extension he gave to Christian Yelich – nine years, $215 million – backfired when Yelich batted only .205.

Center fielder Lorenzo Cain chose to sit out the season due to COVID, so Stearns went out after Avisail Garcia as the best available replacement. Garcia turned in -0.9. Free agents Justin Smoak (-0.9), Brock Holt (-0.7), and Eric Sogard (-0.7) all also backfired.

Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Brewers front office since Stearns took over prior to the 2016 season:

  • 2016:     +   4.9
  • 2017:     +   2.6
  • 2018:     +10.2*
  • 2019:     +  5.8*
  • 2020:     –   4.2

*This was a greater improvement than the margin by which the Brewers qualified for post-season play.

(Photo by Jim Rogash/Getty Images)
(Photo by Jim Rogash/Getty Images) /

Pittsburgh Pirates

Ben Cherington, GM: -4.3

Cherington took over for long-time general manager Neal Huntington following yet another disastrous Pirates 2019 season. He came to the position well-qualified, having formerly served as general manager of the Boston Red Sox, including during the team’s 2013 World Series run.

First-year GMs of losing teams often engage in roster demolitions. One of the interesting aspects of Cherington’s debut season in Pittsburgh was that he largely resisted that course. He released or traded only four players who saw time with other major league teams in 2020, and their departures had only a nominal impact on the team’s fortunes.

He was, however, largely frustrated in his ability to energize the existing roster. Of the 30 personnel moves that affected the Pirates in 2020, only eight produced a positive impact on the team. Easily the most impactful was the promotion of rookie third baseman Ke’Bryan Hayes, who came up Sept. 1 and batted .376. That translated to a 1.6 WAA.

Hayes, however, was the striking exception. Aside from Hayes, the biggest positive mover was pitcher Nick Tropeano, acquired from New York in an August waiver deal. He had a 1.15 ERA in seven relief appearances, good for a  +0.5 WAA.

Most of the rest of what Cherington did simply did not work in the short term. He signed journeyman pitcher Derek Holland as a free agent and got -1.4 WAA in return. Journeyman outfielder Jarrod Dyson returned -0.8 before being shipped out.

(Photo by Andy Lyons/Getty Images)
(Photo by Andy Lyons/Getty Images) /

Cincinnati Reds

Dick Williams, president of baseball ops & Nick Krall, VP and GM: -4.6

The Reds’ 2020 MLB season certainly did not unfold as the front office expected.

What was expected was offense in large quantities. After all, Williams and Krall spent $149 million to sign up free agent sluggers Nick Castellanos, Mike Moustakas, and Shogo Akiyama for four, four, and three years respectively.

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They were to join veteran Joey Votto and developing star Eugenio Suarez. What Williams and Krall got instead was literally baseball’s worst offense: a team .212 batting average and a paltry 390 base hits, 20 fewer than any other team.

Castellanos was a big disappointment, hitting just .225. At .230, Moustakas only beat him by five points in the batting race.

But that was typical for the 2020 Reds additions. Of the 31 players added since the end of the 2019 season, 18 produced negative value, and only eight returned a positive contribution. The most impactful was rookie pitcher Tejay Antone, a bit player whose 134 appearances resulted in a 2.80 ERA and a +0.6 WAA.

By contrast, Williams-Krall made five personnel moves that negatively impacted the Reds by at least -0.7 WAA.

The composite mounted to the National League’s worst front office performance of 2020. Fortunately for the Reds, the existing talent base – notably Trevor Bauer – was good enough to forestall the utter disaster of missing the 16-team playoffs entirely.

Next. MLB: Rating front offices of the AL West. dark

Here is the annual short-term performance rating of the Reds front office since the Williams-Krall tandem was put in place prior to the 2018 season:

  • 2018:     – 0.8
  • 2019:     +3.2
  • 2020:     -4.6
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