Monday’s League Championship Series games provided an excellent illustration of why the strategy of ‘bullpenning’ is fraught with peril. Two teams – the Mets with Sean Manaea and the Yankees with Carlos Rodón -- lined up traditional starters. Their two opponents – the Dodgers and Guardians – adopted strategies that presumed using five, six or more pitchers.
The results: two wins for the classic approach.
In Los Angeles, Manaea gave the Mets a solid five innings, allowing two hits and two earned runs. He did walk four, those leading to two Dodger runs in an eventual 7-3 Mets victory.
By then, however, Manaea was coasting on a six-run lead because Dodger manager Dave Roberts’ strategy blew up.
Roberts started Ryan Brasier, a reliever who had not been stretched more than one inning all season. Brasier allowed a leadoff home run to Francisco Lindor, then gave way to Landon Knack starting the second.
The fundamental flaw of the ‘bullpenning' strategy is its reliance on the highly questionable assumption that every time the bullpen gate opens, an ace will emerge.
Think of it as playing Bullpen Russian Roulette. If one of the five or six times you open that gate, a guy comes out who happens not to have his normal stuff, you can be in big trouble.
That’s what happened to Roberts almost immediately. The first batter Knack faced, Starling Marte, singled. A walk followed, then one out later a double. With two outs, Knack intentionally walked Lindor, only to throw a grand slam gopher ball to Mark Vientos.
Roberts wasn’t two innings in to his bullpenning strategy, and he already trailed by what turned out to be a fatal 6-0.
Dodgers' Dave Roberts dealt fatal NLCS Game 2 blow with bullpenning strategy
At Yankee Stadium, Rodoón went six innings, allowing one run and three hits while fanning nine. Meanwhile, Cleveland manager Stephen Vogt’s strategy blew up almost as quickly in what eventually became a 5-2 Yankee victory. Technically Vogt did start a ‘starter’ – it was Alex Cobb. But as a practical matter, Vogt was also bullpenning.
Cobb had made only three regular season starts – none since Sept. 1 – and his Game 3 Division Series start against Detroit ended after just three innings. There was no realistic prospect of Cobb going deep into this game.
And he didn’t, leaving in the third inning after surrendering a Juan Soto home run and walking the bases full with two out.
The Guardians’ situation at that moment was precarious, but hardly fatal. Vogt called on bullpenner Joey Cantillo to replace Cobb and get the vital third out. What followed was, unless you are a Yankee fan, painful to watch.
Cantillo bounced a breaking ball past catcher Bo Naylor, allowing Aaron Judge to score. He walked Anthony Rizzo to re-fill the bases, then bounced another pitch Naylor couldn’t corral, allowing Stanton to score.
Left in the game to begin the fourth, Cantillo walked Gleyber Torres, then threw two more wild pitches and sent Torres to third base before Vogt mercifully extracted him. The sum total of Cantillo’s line: one-third of an inning pitched, one run plus two inherited runners scoring, three walks and four wild pitches.
The Guardians tried to mount a comeback against New York's pen, but it fell short and they lost 5-2.
Managers – and Vogt and Roberts are both routinely guilty of this – treat their bullpens as if they are populated by robots who will always deliver consistent performance. But baseball games are played by humans, and it is an inescapable law of biology that the more humans you count on to perform, the greater the possibility that one of them will fail.
On Monday, both LCS games were decided in favor of the manager whose game plan assumed the fewest possible personnel changes, and lost by the team whose manager maximized the diversity of human intervention.
The willingness to bullpen can create other issues as well. The Guardians rostered 13 pitchers for their ALCS against the Yankees. But that left them with only four bench options, all of which Vogt had run through by the late innings, when he might have wanted a pinch hitter.
The Monday results provide two illustrations of why developing reliable starting pitching is a better idea than trying to build a deep bullpen.